ABSTRACT GNSS spoofing works as follows: the GNSS signal generator transmits a signal simulation of several satellites at the GNSS frequency. If the level of the simulated signal exceeds the signal strength of real satellites, the GNSS receiver will ''capture'' the fake signal and calculate the position based on it. All receivers that fall into the spoofing zone will calculate the same coordinates, while the receivers located in different places will have a slight mismatch in time. The interference can be done away with such interference that simulates the movement of the receiver along the path defined by the spoofer. Receiver of the GNSS signals determines the XYZT coordinates. Suppose that the receiver has a built-in clock, the accuracy of which is comparable to the accuracy of the clock of GNSS, i.e., in the framework of this paper, we abstract from the need for correction of T. For a ship, only the XY coordinates are significant, so we will focus only on the calculations of the XY coordinates, and the Z coordinate is used only to detect a spoofing. This paper proposes three methods of spoofing detection using a single antenna, including measuring the altitude of a victim, measuring the coordinates of a moving victim at two points on the route, and measuring the victim's coordinates in two points of space using a rotating antenna.
I. INTRODUCTION
Satellite-based navigation remains the predominant navigation solution for both commercial and military applications. However, proven threats to GNSS from jamming, spoofing, and environmental blockages have convinced the military, as well as many commercial technology firms, that now is the time to find new navigation solutions that can enhance GNSS.
The receiver of GNSS signals determines the XYZT coordinates. Suppose that the receiver has a built-in clock, the accuracy of which is comparable to the accuracy of the clock of GNSS, i.e. for the purpose of this article, we neglect the correction of T. For a ship, only the XY coordinates are significant, so we will focus only on the calculations of the XY coordinates.
The three methods of spoofing detection discussed in this paper use a single antenna, and include measurements of, respectively: the altitude of the victim, the coordinates of a moving victim at two points on the route and the victim's coordinates at two points of space using a rotating antenna.
It is necessary to emphasize that we use a conventional satellite antenna, that is, the problem of practical implementation of spoofing detection is reduced only to programming.
The strategy of escaping spoofing is as follows. A developed spoofer simulates GNSS signals in such a way that at the moment of the victim's capture, the false coordinates coincide with the real ones and then simulate the movement of the receiver along a certain trajectory [1] - [3] .
II. NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
• z 0 (x, y)− known sea level at the point (x, y) of the sea or ocean.
• Sat i → x i , y i , z i , i = 1, N − satellites of GNSS, N -the number of visible satellites.
• Spoofing -an attack on a GNSS, in an attempt to deceive the GNSS receiver by transmitting powerful false signals that mimic the signals from the true GNSS, exceeding the power of these true signals.
• Spoofer -complex computer and radio equipment for the implementation of GNSS spoofing.
• x s , y s − coordinates of the spoofer (z s = 0).
• x v , y v − victim's coordinates, as measured by the spoofer (z v = 0).
• x v , y v − amendment of victim's coordinates, taking away the victim from a given route.
• x v , y v , z v − victim's coordinates, as measured by the victim.
• T i − the measured signal's propagation time from the satellite Sat i to the spoofer using GNSS signals or to the victim with the help of a false signal of the spoofer.
• c -speed of light.
• the real wave fronts from real satellites will be denoted by green lines (as in Figure 1 ).
• the fake wave fronts from the spoofer will be denoted by red lines (as in Figure 3 ).
III. GNSS OF A SPOOFER AND A VICTIM
Solving the system of equations (1) allows us to calculate the spoofer's coordinates {x s , y s }. To determine the coordinates (XY), there is enough data from two satellites, however, as the practice of long-term operation of GNSS shows, due to the approximate nature of the measurement of pseudoranges (ρ i ≈ cT i , i = 1, N ), the positioning accuracy (XY) will depend on the number of visible satellites N.
Suppose we know the victim's coordinates {x v , y v }, for example, using a radar range finder and a measured direction to the victim. In this case (2), it is possible to determine the corrections T i for measured time T i so that the receiver of the victim would calculate the fake coordinates equal to the true ones.
If the power of the spoofer's signal exceeds the power of the GNSS signals, the victim's receiver switches to receiving a false signal. Further, the spoofer applies an escaping spoofing strategy in accordance with the equation system (3).
where { x v , y v } -amendment of victim's coordinates, taking away the victim from its route.
IV. SPOOFING DETECTION
In this section, we will mainly follow the results obtained in [8] - [11] . The solution of the equation system (4) allows VOLUME 6, 2018 calculating the fake coordinates of the victim {x v , y v , z v }.
where T i -measured propagation time of a signal from a satellite Sat i to the victim with the help of a false spoofer's signal.
Taking into account that the victim is on the surface of the sea with a known sea levelz v ∼ = z 0 , we can apply the following decision rule to detect spoofing:
where z 0 -permissible error of measured sea level value ( Figure 4 ). 
V. THE PERMISSIBLE ERROR OF THE MEASURED SEA LEVEL VALUE
The sea level is measured on a plumb line relative to some conventional reference point and is determined by the law of gravity, the Earth's rotation moment, temperature, tides, wind waves, sea surface temperature and atmospheric pressure fluctuations, precipitation and evaporation, and many other factors. There are ''instantaneous'', tidal, average daily, average monthly, and average annual sea levels.
The average annual sea level constant at each point is taken as the reference level, from which heights on land are measured. For calculating the depths of seas with low tides, this level is taken as the datum -reference water level, from which the depths are measured in accordance with the requirements of navigation. For example, in most Baltic countries, the absolute heights of the points on the earth's surface are measured from the average annual level of the Baltic Sea. Depths and heights in Western European countries are calculated according to the Amsterdam Ordnance Datum (the level of the Mediterranean Sea is measured relative to the Marseille tide gauge). For the US and Canada, the reference point is located near the Canadian city of Rimouski, for China -near the city of Qingdao.
Since there are many factors that affect global weather changes, predictions and estimates of ocean level changes in the near future are not particularly accurate.
The methodology for monitoring sea level and its changes using freely available signals of GNSS was first proposed in [4] . Since then, several remote sensing studies of the ocean have been conducted using GNSS signals using ground, airborne and space systems, for example [5] - [7] , respectively. The advantage of using reflected GNSS signals for remote sensing of the sea surface, in comparison with traditional gauges, is the possibility of measuring absolute sea level, that is, sea level in relation to the International Terrestrial Reference Frame (ITRF).
Given the volatile nature of the sea level, we decided to abandon the measurement of the real value and take advantage of the simple moving average (SMA) of the coordinate (z). Suppose that the victim receives real GNSS signals. The solution of the system of equations (6) allows us to calculate the real coordinates of the victim {x v , y v , z v }.
where T i -measured propagation time of a signal from a satellite Sat i to the victim using real GNSS signals.
We denote the sequence of measurements z v as
SMA coordinate (z) can be obtained by the following recurrence formula:
79076 VOLUME 6, 2018 In view of (7) or (8), the decisive rule for detecting spoofing can be written as
where z 0 -permissible error of measured sea level value. The main advantage of the proposed method is the possibility of using conventional single-antenna GNSS navigation systems to determine spoofing. However, you can design a spoof that will always set the fake altitude of the victim above sea level to zero. In this case, the proposed method for determining spoofing is not applicable..
To determine spoofing in this case, we developed spoofing detectors based on measurements of the victim's position at two points in 2D or 3D space (see sections VI and VII of this article).
VI. GNSS SPOOFING DETECTION USING A SINGLE ANTENNA BASED ON MEASURING THE COORDINATES OF A MOVING VICTIM AT TWO POINTS ON THE ROUTE
We install a fixed single antenna on the spoofing detector. Note that the ship may be in motion.
A. THE SEA LEVEL MEASUREMENT IN NORMAL NAVIGATION MODE
The spoofing detector measures the coordinates of the antenna Y: (10) where ( 
where V -speed of victim's movement.
B. MEASUREMENT OF SPACING BETWEEN TWO POSITIONS OF THE SINGLE ANTENNA IN SPOOFING MODE
A ship receives the same signal as the spoofer, but with some delay t v s . It means that all receivers in the spoofing zone calculate the same false coordinates, regardless of the distance from the spoofer to the victim:
where D v s = c t v s -the distance from the spoofer to the antenna Y at the time t, (x s ,ŷ s ,ẑ s ) -calculated coordinates of the spoofer using the antenna Y at the time t.
where D v s = c t v s -the distance from the spoofer to the antenna Y at the time t = t + t, (x s ,ŷ s ,ẑ s ) -the calculated coordinates of the spoofer using the antenna Y at the time t = t + t.
In this case, the distance between the antenna Y at the time t and the antenna Y at the time t = t + t is defined asD
If we take into account that at seaẑ s =ẑ s , then expression 15a becomes:
(15b)
C. THE DECISIVE RULE
Comparing (12) and (15a or 15b), we can write down the decisive rule for detecting spoofing ifD 1−2 ≤Ď then go to Spoofing (16) whereĎ -discriminant, determined on the basis of statistical studies at the stage of designing a real detection system.
VII. GNSS SPOOFING DETECTION USING A ROTATING ANTENNA
We install a rotating single-antenna Y on the spoofing detector ( Figure 6 ). Denote the position of the antenna at the time t as Y , the position of the antenna at the time t = t + t as Y and the distance between the two antenna positions as 2R.
Note that the ship may be at rest or in motion. VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 5. GNSS spoofing detection for a fixed single-antenna ships in motion.
A. MEASURING THE DISTANCE BETWEEN TWO POSITIONS OF A ROTATING SINGLE ANTENNA IN NORMAL NAVIGATION MODE
The spoofing detector measures the coordinates of the antenna Y in two positions: 
coordinates of the antenna Y at the timet = t + T /2, where T -rotation period of antenna Y.
The measured distance between the antenna Y at the time t and the antenna Y at the time t = t + T /2 will be comparable with the magnitude 2R:
If we take into account that at seaẑ v =ẑ v , then expression 19a becomes: 
B. MEASUREMENT OF SPACING BETWEEN TWO POSITIONS OF A ROTATING SINGLE ANTENNA IN SPOOFING MODE
The ship receives the same signal as the spoofer, but with some delay t v s . It means that all receivers in the spoofing zone () calculate the same false coordinates, regardless of the distance from the spoofer to the victim:
where D v s -distance from the spoofer to the antenna Y at the time t, (x s ,ŷ s ,ẑ s ) -calculated coordinates of the spoofer using the antenna Y at the time t.
where D v s = D v s + D -distance from the spoofer to the antenna Y at the time t = t + t, (x s ,ŷ s ,ẑ s ) -calculated coordinates of the spoofer using the antenna Y at the time t = t + t.
In this case, the distance between the antenna Y at the time t and the antenna Y at the time t = t + t is defined aŝ
When the forwarding delay controlled by the spoofer is time variant, the spoofing locations of the victim at different times are not equal and in this case, it is necessary to introduce an additional amendment. Therefore, in the equations (15a), (15b) and (22) approximations to zero (∼0) were introduced.
C. THE DECISIVE RULE
Comparing (19) and (22), we can write down the decisive rule for detecting spoofing ifD 1−2 ≤Ď then go to Spoofing (23) whereĎ -discriminant, determined on the basis of statistical studies at the stage of designing a real detection system. As the results of measuring the coordinates of the vessel in the normal navigation mode would not depend on the speed of the vessel, measurements are made at antenna angles of ± 90 degrees relative to the direction of vessel movement (heading). It should be emphasized that the results of measuring the coordinates of the vessel in the spoofing mode do not depend on the speed of the vessel, as long as the vessel is in the zone of spoofing.
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
In this paper, we conducted an experimental study of GNSS spoofing detection using a single antenna based on measurements of the height of the victim above sea level. A satellite signal repeater is used as a spoofer (Figure 7 ). All vessels located in the repeater's area define their own XYZ coordinates as the coordinates of the repeater.
1. Before the start of the experiment, we measure the coordinates XYZ of the vessel (Figure 8 ), wherein Z ≈ z 0 (X , Y) -known sea level at the point (X , Y) of the sea 62.46 m. 2. On the coast, at a height H (for example, H = 5 m) above sea level, a repeater is installed ( Figure 9 ) and we measure the coordinates XYZ of the vessel, wherein Z s ≈ z 0 (X , Y) +H ≈ 70.93. 3. On the coast, at a height H ≈ z 0 (X , Y) above sea level, a repeater is installed ( Figure 10 ) and we measure the coordinates XYZ of the vessel, wherein Z ≈ z 0 (X , Y) = 61.20. In conclusion of this section, it should be noted that measurements of the coordinates of a moving victim at two points on the route and at two points of space using a rotating antenna tested by simulation methods. A prototype antispoofing system /device??/ for testing at sea is now being constructed.
IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper discusses the threats caused by GNSS vulnerabilities and the keys to solving the challenge of providing reliable, unjammable positioning, navigation, and timing.
The risk of losing GNSS signal is growing every day. The accessories necessary for the manufacture of systems for GNSS ''jamming'' and/or ''spoofing'' are now widely available and this type of attack can be utilized by the military, but by terrorists too. The distortion of the signal includes a signal capture and playback at the same frequency with a slight shift in time and with greater intensity, in order to VOLUME 6, 2018 deceive the electronic equipment of a ship and, therefore, the operator if there is one on board the ship.
It is important to emphasize that GNSS is not only navigation. In the framework of the current threat model, GNSS interference is needed in order to drown out the reference signal of synchronous time that is used in a distributed network of radio electronic devices. That is, GNSS allows you to synchronize with high accuracy time in stand-alone passive devices.
Synchronous time is also necessary for data transfer in low-visibility communication mode: receivers and repeaters must have a total time to correctly adjust the correlation parameters, allowing to isolate the masked signal, which is indistinguishable from noise for an outside observer. And this, of course, is not a complete list of data transfer operations.
Advantages and disadvantages of the three methods of spoofing detection are shown in Table 1 . The main advantage of all three methods of spoofing detection is the use of only one antenna. Some complexity arises in the implementation of the N3 method in connection with the need to rotate the antenna of the victim.
To implement the spoofing, we used a land spoofer (z s = 0), however, when using a flying spoofer, no additional problems arise.
You can design a spoofer, which will always set the fake altitude of the victim above sea level, equal to zero. In this case, the N1 method is not applicable.
The ratio of the allowable velocities of the spoofer and the victim for the method N2 requires additional investigation ( Table 1 indicates that the need for the rest of the spoof antenna is ''Yes'').
